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One of the most important global financial problems to emerge in the 1 990s wasthe
crippling of the Japanese banking system. Japanese bankswith large shareholdings had their
capital seriously eroded by the collapse of the Japanesestock market at the beginning of the
decade. The depletion of bank capital was exacerbated by the dramatic decreasein commercial
real estate prices, resulting in huge increases in nonperforming loans. Not onlyhas the banking
crisis slowed the recovery of the world's second largest economy (IMF 1998),it has dramatically
decreased lending by the largest global lenders.
During the early 1990s, all ten of the world's largest banks were headquarteredin Japan.
In addition, their aggressive international expansion during the 1980s hadresulted in significant
foreign penetration.' Much of this international expansionhad been funded by heavy reliance on
purchased funds. At their peak, Japanese banks were borrowing over$100 billion from other
financial institutions, financed in part by Eurodollar and Euroyen borrowing. Although
inadequate capital ratios had already provided an incentivefor Japanese banks to shrink their
international lending (Peek and Rosengren 1997, 1999), the emergence of a premium paidfor
interbank borrowing by Japanese banks relative to their major competitors in theUnited States
and Europe, the "Japan premium," made much of their international lending unprofitableand
further pressured Japanese banks to shrink. This development has significantramifications for
the financial health of the Japanese banking system, for the role of Japanesebanks in global
lending, and for the development of Japanese government programs toresolve their banking
crisis.The emergence of the Japan premium is critically important to Japanese banks because
they pursued strategies contingent on exploiting cost advantages relative to U.S. and European
banks. By focusing on high-volume, low-margin businesses, Japanese banks were able to rapidly
expand their global penetration at a time when they had excess capital as a result of rising stock
prices during the 1 980s. Low-margin businesses did not require establishing lending
relationships. Instead, Japanese banks relied on prices that were low relative to those of
competitors. Their low borrowing costs enabled them to rapidly expand lending to blue chip
U.S. companies, aggressively expand lending in offshore centers such as Hong Kong and
Singapore, and have a strong presence in many off-balance-sheet activities, such as lines of
credit.
The emergence of the Japan premium was a major impediment to competing for low-
margin businesses. McCauley and Yeaple (1994) report that many Asian loan participations
were for less than 75 basis points over LIBOR. During several periods, Japanese banks were
paying a Japan premium of more than 75 basis points for their interbank borrowing for both
Eurodollar and Euroyen contracts. This would result in a loss on any new loans funded by
interbank borrowing, even ignoring the overhead costs involved in loan participations. With
interbank borrowing at 1997 levels and a 75-basis-point premium that was maintained for an
entire year, the additional funding costs for Japanese banks would amount to approximately $1
billion dollars. Such large potential losses encouraged Japanese banks to decrease activities that
were originally initiated by exploiting cost advantages. Consistent with this result, Japanese
banks have dramatically decreased lending in the United States, lending to off-shore markets
such as Singapore and Hong Kong, and off-balance-sheet activities.
2The Japan premium also has ramifications for global finance. A higher Japan premium
encourages Japanese banks to significantly alter their activities, reducing their exposures in
foreign credit markets and in many of the wholesale markets. The associated retrenchment by
Japanese banks in specific credit markets raises costs to loan customers in those markets
generally. In particular, Japanese banks will be less prepared to lend on past terms to current
borrowers, providing an incentive to renegotiate or end some lending relationships. This
retrenchment will be particularly significant in Southeast Asia; not only are Japanese banks the
largest global lenders there, but their activities have been particularly focused in many Southeast
Asian countries. Furthermore, any retrenchment will occur at a time when bank loan substitutes
may be difficult to find in Southeast Asian markets.
The Japan premium is also important for government policies towards banks. The
increases in the Japan premium around the time of the Hokkaido Takushoku failure were used to
justify avoiding additional closures of large troubled banks, although subsequently Nippon
Credit Bank (NCB) and Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB) were nationalized. These increases
have also been used to justify the infusion of government money into troubled banks, the
encouragement of large, healthier banks to acquire (or financially support) their more troubled
brethren (the convoy policy), and the implementation of accounting practices that improve
capital ratios but reduce still further the transparency of bank accounting statements. Thus,
understanding the determinants of the Japan premium may be useful in evaluating the wisdom of
many of the bank reform measures that have been implemented recently or are being considered
at this time.
3This paper examines the factors most responsible for movements in the Japan premium
since 1995. Major financial market disruptions, major government policy actions, and major
changes in financial market conditions all had an impact on the size of the Japan premium. The
largest movements in the Japan premium appear to be associated with announcements of large,
previously undisclosed losses. For example, the announcement of the failure of Hokkaido
Takushoku was not associated with an increase in the Japan premium, while the announcement
of large previously unreported losses associated with the Yamaichi Securities failure caused the
premium to increase substantially.
Government actions also influenced the Japan premium. Major injections of government
funds directly into banks decreased the Japan premium. Such announcements would clearly
indicate a desire by the government to resolve the banking crisis, and the new infusions of equity
capital would reduce the probability that banks would be closed. Actions to strengthen
supervision raised the premium on short-term eurodollar and euroyen borrowing, consistent with
an increased probability that the weaker institutions would fail. Actions encouraging mergers of
strong with weaker institutions also increased the Japan premium. Requiring healthy banks to
bail out their weaker brethren would make questionable the financial health of even the strongest
Japanese banks. In contrast, government statements not associated with concrete actions had
little impact.
The first section of the paper discusses general movements in the Japan premium since
1995 and the recent retrenchments by Japanese banks from wholesale banking markets. The
second section discusses the data and methodology. The third section investigates factors that
have affected the size of the Japan premium. The final section concludes.
41. Background
The Japan premium emerged in August 1995 and was widespread, with all major
Japanese banks required to pay higher interest rates on interbank Eurodollar and Euroyen
borrowing than those paid by large U.S. and European banks. That this risk premium was
assessed by the markets only in late 1995 is particularly striking because the precipitous declines
in Japanese equity and commercial real estate prices that had resulted in a substantial
deterioration in the financial health of Japanese banks had occurred much earlier.
It was a change in the perceived willingness of the Japanese government to protect
unsecured creditors that altered the willingness of internationally active banks to lend to Japanese
banks on roughly the same terms as to major U.S. and European banks. Prior to August 1995, no
Japanese commercial bank had failed in the postwar period. While financial failures had
occurred, they had been relatively small credit cooperatives that were not publicly traded, since
they were privately held by their depositors. Furthermore, non-depository creditors as well as
depository creditors (including those with deposits above deposit insurance ceilings) had been
fully protected by the Japanese government. Thus, government policies toward financial failures
had led many to believe that the Japanese government would not allow a publicly traded
commercial bank to fail, but that if it did, major stakeholders would be protected.
This illusion collapsed with the failure of Hyogo Bank. Hyogo was the 38th largest bank
in Japan, with $37 billion in assets. Its failure marked the first time that a publicly traded
commercial bank was allowed to fail (Brewer et al. 1 999)2 In addition, shareholders and large
creditors of the bank suffered losses. Because the largest shareholders and creditors were other
banks, this involved significant losses for many of Japan's biggest banks.
5Eurodollar and Euroyen lenders would experience losses if a Japanese bank failed and the
Japanese government allowed non-depository creditors to share in the losses. The failure of
Hyogo and its resolution highlighted the possibility that both of these conditions might well be
met. As a result, all Japanese banks borrowing in the Eurodollar and Euroyen market began to
pay premiums over the interbank rates paid by U.S. and European banks. It was viewed as a
"Japan premium," rather than just an individual bank risk premium, because all Japanese banks
were required by the market to pay roughly the same premium, regardless of their relative
financial health. That all Japanese banks had to pay this premium had significant ramifications,
not only for the international banking strategy of Japanese banks, which had depended on
interbank borrowing to fund their rapid global expansion, but also for the global cost of funds for
borrowers in markets in which Japanese banks had been active lenders.
Figure 1 shows the Japan premium for interbank loan rates (ILR5) on one-year yen
contracts. The spread is shown for two banks, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi and Fuji Bank, and is
calculated as the difference between the one-year rate reported by each of the Japanese banks and
the average ILR for the six banks from the United States and the United Kingdom that are
included in the LIBOR quote. Because Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (BOTM) is one of the
strongest Japanese banks and tends to pay the lowest Japan premium, the spread between its ILR
and that of the U.S.-U.K. average ILR can serve as a proxy for the base "Japan premium." On
the other hand, other major Japanese banks, such as Fuji Bank, have been considered to be
relatively more troubled. While both banks paid essentially the same premium from August
1995 until November 1997, since that time (especially following the failure of Yamichi
6Securities), the major Japanese banks have been required by the market to pay a premium larger
than that paid by BOTM.
The Japan premium has been high during four distinct periods since 1995: The late
summer-early fall of 1995, when the premium first emerged; after several large financial
nationalizations in November 1997; a brief sharp spike in late June 1998 when LTCB first was
rumored to merge with Sumitomo Trust; and in October of 1998. Because of the size of the
Japan premium, particularly since November 1997, Japanese banks have suffered from a major
cost disadvantage relative to their European and U.S. competitors. For example, while U.S. and
British banks bought one-year Euroyen funds for 0.19 percent, on average, in October 1998, the
cost to Japanese banks averaged 0.78 percent, a cost of funds four times greater than that of their
competitors. The same pattern emerged in the Eurodollar market. While the average cost of
one-year Eurodollar interbank loans for U.S. and British banks was 4.82 percent in October
1998, the comparable rate for Japanese banks was 5.58 percent.
Such a large (76-basis-point for the Eurodollar contract) cost disadvantage for marginal
funds would likely eliminate Japanese banks from many loan participations. McCauley and
Yeaple (1994) report that many of the large Asian loan participations in earlier years had been
for less than 75 basis points over LIBOR. The magnitude of the premium indicates that the cost
of marginal funds has made many loan participations uneconomical for Japanese banks, and it
would not be surprising to observe these banks pulling back from markets characterized by low
margins.
In fact, the Japan premium has become a major impediment to the global strategy of
many Japanese banks. While their problems with low capital ratios and substantial
7nonperforming loans had already caused many Japanese banks to pull back from U.S. markets
beginning in 1992 (McCauley and Yeaple 1994 ;Peekand Rosengren 1997, 1999), the pressure
to retrench was intensified to the extent that Japanese banks no longer had cost advantages.
Beginning in 1995, Japanese banks began retreating from offshore markets such as Hong Kong
and Singapore (Peek and Rosengren 1998), and they continued to withdraw from low-margin
markets in the United States. While problems with maintaining Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) capital requirements that emerged in the early 1 990s caused the initial decline
in Japanese lending overseas, the emergence of the Japan premium in 1995 made many of these
activities unprofitable, as well as an expensive use for scarce capital.
2. Methodology for Examining the Determinants of the Japan Premium
The existence of the Japan premium indicates that creditors believe they have a higher
probability of a loss of principal and interest from loans to Japanese banks than they do from
loans to U.S. and European banks. Evaluating the risks from lending to Japanese banks involves
making two assessments. The first is related to an economic question: What is the probability
that the bank will experience losses sufficient to make it insolvent? The second is partly political
and partly economic: Given the failure of one or more Japanese banks, will the government be
able and willing to shield creditors from losses? If Japanese banks have a higher probability of
failure or a lower probability of receiving government support, compared to their U.S. or
European peers, then creditors will demand an additional risk premium to provide interbank
loans to a Japanese bank. Note that even if Japanese banks had a much higher probability of
8failure, if the Japanese government could credibly stand ready to guarantee all debts, Japanese
banks might not be required to pay an additional premium.
The Japan premium data are based on the individual quotes from the contributor panel of
banks used to calculate LIBOR. The data are from Bloomberg and represent the quotes used by
the British Bankers Association (BBA) for the daily LIBOR fixing as of 11:00 a.m. London
time.3 Note that 11:00 a.m. London time would correspond to 8:00 p.m. in Tokyo, well after the
financial markets had closed for the day and after most announcements in Japan that occur after
the close of Japanese trading.4
We focus on Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi and Fuji Bank because they are the only Japanese
participants included in the LIBOR panels for all four contracts considered in this study, and they
were deemed to be sufficiently active to not be dropped in January 1999 when the BBA changed
the composition of its LIBOR panel. This should obviate any concerns with the contract being
an offer rate rather than a transactions price, a potential problem if we focused on banks that the
BBA felt were no longer active enough to remain in the panel of banks used for the LIBOR
quote.5
Figure 1 showed the level of the Japan premium as the difference between what BOTM
and Fuji pay on a given LIBOR contract relative to the average paid by U.S. and U.K. banks.
Our empirical work estimates the following equation:6
A JPREMI UM ,,ao + AMARKETII +a2 EVENT,+s,,. (1)
9The dependent variable, AJPREMIUM, is the change in the ILR quote reported for the
Japanese bank on day t for a particular contract (currency and duration), minus the corresponding
change in the average ILR offered by U.S. and U.K. banks for a contract with the same currency
and duration. The change is calculated as the difference between two contiguous trading days.7
The estimation uses daily data for the period February 1, 1995, through March 31, 1999.
We examine four different LIBOR contracts: the one-month U.S. dollar ILR, the one-
year dollar ILR, the one-month yen ILR, and the one-year yen ILR. The average of the ILR
quotes for the set of U.S. and U.K. banks that serves as the reference rate are for those banks
included by the BBA in the LIBOR fixing (as reported by Bloomberg) for the particular contract
on date t.8 The individual quotes are frequently the same across these banks on any given day and
they generally track each other quite well. Thus, the average would not be affected materially by
the inclusion or exclusion of a particular bank from our sample.
The first set of explanatory variables (AMARKET) controls for changes in market
variables that might affect the probability of Japanese bank failures. Japanese banks have
extensive cross-shareholdings with many of their major loan customers. Prior to recent
accounting changes, accrued capital gains on these holdings were counted in Tier 2 capital,
directly affecting their reported total capital. While reported capital has now been insulated from
market movements at those banks that have chosen to report shareholdings at book rather than
market values, the true economic capital of Japanese banks will still be impaired by potential
losses on their shareholdings, should they need to liquidate their cross-shareholding positions.
To control for sensitivity to the likelihood of Japanese banks failing based on potential capital
losses on their shareholdings, we include the percent change in the Nikkei index for that day.9
I0We use the quote for the same day because the Nikkei is closed for the day prior to 11:00 a.m.
London time when the LIBOR is fixed. The second variable in this set is the percentage change
in the yen-dollar exchange rate for the previous trading day. The exchange rate may be
important for a number of reasons. For example, a decline in the value of the yen will increase
the yen value of dollar-denominated assets held by Japanese banks, putting pressure on bank
capital ratios as the yen value of assets rises relative to yen-denominated bank capital. Because
we use the value at the New York close for the exchange rate, this variable is lagged one day.
The second set of variables is composed of dummy variables that capture particular
events that might be relevant to either the probability of Japanese bank failures or the ability or
willingness of the government to protect creditors from such failures. The dummy variables are
constructed to have a value of one on the event day and zero otherwise. The estimated
coefficient on the dummy variable indicates the one-day change in the level of the Japan
premium associated with the event.
The events are grouped into five general categories: ratings downgrades, failures of
financial institutions, failures of nonfinancial firms, government announcements of concrete
actions, and government announcements representing statements unaccompanied by concrete
actions (words). Table 1 provides a chronological list of the events used in the study with the
date and event category identified, as well as a brief description of each event.
For all but the actual failures of financial institutions, we create a one-day event window
for each event. We include a two-day event window for a failure of a financial institution, in
order to capture the uncertainty surrounding the nature of the resolution of financial failures
during this period. It is possible to so narrow the event window because Japanese markets have
11already closed by the 11:00 a.m. London fixing of the LIBOR quotes. All events are verified to
ensure that the announcement was available at 11:00 a.m. London time.'° This enables us to
avoid the wider windows employed in most studies, which often cannot verify whether, on the
day of the event, the announcement occurred before the market opened, while the market was
open, or after the close. Because the events often occur in clusters, wider event windows would
complicate the estimation and the interpretation of the results, and in many instances the event
windows would include dates that overlapped with those for other events.
The first set of events relates to the role of outside monitors. Rating agencies may have
less information than the government about the condition of banks, but they may be more
objective in assessing the information they do have. The rating agencies are worried about the
risk that creditors will experience losses. Thus, their evaluations include assessments of the
financial health of the firm as well as of the likelihood that the government will arrange an exit
for the bank that does not result in losses to creditors." We include announcements of actual
downgrades of Japanese banks. We include only announcements in which at least two Japanese
banks are mentioned and at least one of the banks being downgraded is one of the nine Japanese
banks active in the dollar or yen LIBOR markets.'2 This permits a focus on major downgrades
and eliminates the numerous downgrades associated with scandals or problems at individual
banks.
The second set of events focuses on failures of Japanese financial institutions. We
include failures of banks and of other financial firms that might alter the probability of failure of
individual banks or of all banks. We limit the set of failure events to those of firms with at least
1 trillion yen in assets, as of 1994.'
12The third set of events contains failures of nonfinancial firms with assets exceeding 250
trillion yen. Large nonfinancial failures are potentially important, insofar as they reveal either a
larger volume of nonperforming loans at banks than previously reported or a lower probability of
recovery for previously declared nonperforming loans.
The next two sets of events include government announcements. Because of the large
number of government announcements made during this period, we limited this set to those
announcements deemed to be major, in order to keep the set of events manageable. To ensure
objectivity in the selection, we restricted the set of government announcements considered to
those reported in The Wall Street Journal in a long or medium-length article directly related to
the banking industry, plus those events highlighted by the Bank of Japan in the Chronology of
Events for each fiscal year reported in its Annual Review. The Wall Street Journal articles were
identified using the Japan section of The Wall Street Journal Index. Once the announcements
were identified, they were checked on Bloomberg to obtain a definitive time for the
announcement, so that the correct day for the event dummy variable could be identified.
Government announcements were further subdivided into announcements of concrete
actions and announcements with no concrete actions. Announcements of concrete actions
include four subcategories: those related to the infusion of government funds into banks, actions
to strengthen supervision, actions taken to relax regulations, and government actions encouraging
healthy banks to acquire the weaker banks (the convoy system). We include five subcategories
of statements unaccompanied by concrete actions (words): statements of intentions to resolve
the nonperforming loan problem, statements that banking problems had been resolved,
statements concerning the need to expand disclosure, and announcements of changes in the total
13amount of nonperforming loans at banks. We also include ascontrol variables a set of events
related to resolving the Jusen problems and five miscellaneous announcementsthat are less
specific to banking problems. These include the announcementof Daiwa's failure to reveal
banking problems to the Federal Reserve, the transfer ofKizu Credit assets and liabilities to
Tokyo Kyodou Bank, the resignation of the financeminister over bank-related scandals, the
adoption of tax breaks for resolving bad loans at banks,and the first report on the Total Plan.
While each of these events potentially could be important, neither the setof Jusen events nor any
of the five announcements in the miscellaneous category produced significanteffects and thus
are not reported in the tables.
3. Empirical Results
The Japan Premium for BOTM
Table 2 presents the results from estimating equation 1 for each of thefour LIBOR
contracts over the period February 1, 1995, through March 31, 1999,for the change in the Japan
premium paid by BOTM, deemed to be the "base" Japan premium.Because both one-year
contracts exhibited significant negative serial correlation, these two equationshave been
corrected for serially correlated errors. Each equation includes controlvariables not reported in
the table including the percent change in the Nikkei index, the percent changein the yen-dollar
exchange rate, the set of Jusen announcements and thefive miscellaneous events.
The ratings changes over this period are all downgrades. Of the 29 downgrades, onlytwo
have significant effects for at least two of the contracts. We report these two eventsseparately,
and constrain the remaining 27 downgrades to have the same (average)effect)4 For these 27
14downgrades, the average estimated effect is positive for each contract, but never statistically
significant. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients indicate that while announcements of
ratings downgrades tend to raise the Japan premium, the average effect is quite modest (only
about 1 basis point). The two events for which at least two of the equations indicate a positive
and significant event are the Fitch IBCA (IBCA) downgrades on 12/2/97 and the announcement
by Moody's on 4/3/98 of a change to negative in the outlook for Japan's currency ceiling.
Presumably, Moody's announcement that it was changing the outlook for Japan's currency
ceiling would affect the borrowing costs of Japanese companies generally, and this likely
accounts for it having a larger impact on the Japan premium than announcements that were
downgrades of individual banks. While public policy announcements have sometimes
emphasized the role of outside monitors in contributing to the large size of the Japan premium,
only two ratings downgrades were associated with significant changes in the magnitude of the
Japan premium.
The next set of events includes announcements related to failures of major financial
institutions. For actual failures, we use a two-day event window that includes the day of the
announcement as well as the day after the announcement, in order to account for the fact that the
initial announcement may not provide much indication of how the government is likely to
resolve the failure. Information about the resolution of the failure is likely to have a major effect
on the Japan premium. We include separate event dummy variables for three of the major
financial failure dates. The Hyogo BanklKizu Credit event and the Yamaichi Securities event are
shown separately because they have individual effects that are significant for at least two of the
contracts. The Hokkaido Takushoku event is shown separately because it played an important
15role in the discussions of the costs and benefits of bank closures. The remaining failures
(Taiheiyo Bank, Crown Leasing, Japan Leasing, LTCB, and NCB) do not produce individual
effects that are significant, so they are grouped together, with their average effect shown. This
effect is quite small, with three of the four estimated effects being negative and none significant.
The failures of Hyogo Bank and Kizu Credit at the end of August 1995 heralded the
emergence of the Japan premium. The estimated effect on the Japan premium is positive
(ranging from 5to10 basis points per day for the two-day event window) and statistically
significant for all four contracts. As was described earlier, this event shattered illusions that
commercial banks would not be allowed to fail and that, if a failure did occur, all creditors would
be shielded from losses.
The failure of Hokkaido Takushoku in November 1997 represented the first time a major
city bank had been allowed to fail. However, the estimated effect is negative for the two one-
month contracts, although none of the four estimated effects is significant. One possible
explanation for the failure to find an effect could be that the information was released earlier.
However, Brewer et al. (1999) do find it to be a highly significant event for share prices of both
Hokkaido Takushoku and for other banks. Such evidence is not consistent with the information
being fully released prior to the event. While not statistically significant, a negative impact on
the Japan premium is consistent with investors being relieved that the government was taking
actions against the most troubled banks and would likely use government funds to resolve the
losses, and that other banks were not expected to fund the losses. Consistent with this result, on
the day after the failure, the Prime Minister announced that public funds would be available
(although he retracted the statement the following day).
16When Yamaichi Securities failed the following week, the reaction was quite different.
For this event, the estimated effect is positive (ranging from over 6 to almost 13 basis pointsper
day for the two-day event window) and significant for each of the four contracts. The Yamaichi
failure took many investors by surprise. It highlighted the fact that the extent of Japanese
financial problems had not been fully disclosed, because it was announced that many of the
losses had not been previously reported. Furthermore, the uncertainty about the disposition of
creditor positions, and the concerns that many other financial institutions might have similar
large undisclosed losses, likely resulted in a substantial reevaluation by foreign banks of their
exposure to Japanese banks. The day after the failure, the finance minister and the governor of
the Bank of Japan announced that there would be no more bankruptcies of financial institutions.
Unlike the announcements after the Hokkaido Takushoku failure, the responses did not instill
confidence in investors that the government was going to take decisive actions to clear up
problem financial institutions.
The nonfinancial failure announcements include the largest during our sample period,
those with assets greater than 250 million yen.'5 The average estimated effect of these
nonfinancial firm failure announcements is quite small and never significant. Although these
failures may have provided information on the extent and severity of the problem loanexposures
of Japanese banks, any new information provided by the announcements was not sufficient to
affect the magnitude of the Japan premium in a meaningful way.
Government announcements of actions to resolve banking problems frequently result in a
significant reaction by the Japan premium. We report the average effect of each category of
government announcements. Because the primary focus of the paper is to understand how
17government words and actions influenced the Japan premium, we report additional statistics to
determine the significance of specific groups of events. Underneath the estimated coefficients,
we report the absolute value of the t-statistic associated with the average effect, followed by the
F-statistic for the hypothesis that each of the individual coefficients for the events in the category
is equal to zero. We include the F-statistic because the size of the effects of the announcements
across the events in a given category can be quite heterogeneous, and the F-statistic indicates
whether we can reject the hypothesis that the set of events as a group had no impact on the Japan
premium. The asterisks for statistical significance for these estimated coefficients are associated
with the F-statistics rather than the t-statistic.
The average estimated effect of the ten major announcements related to the infusion of
funds into the banking system reduced the Japan premium for all four contracts, with three of the
four estimated effects being significant. Measures to strengthen supervision increased the Japan
premium in all four contracts, but were statistically significant only for the one-month contracts.
Similarly, the announcement on December 29, 1997, to postpone implementation of the new
capital standards and the relaxation of other accounting rules to bolster bank capital, such as
allowing banks to value their extensive cross-shareholdings at book rather than market values,
reduced the premium for three of the four contracts, although only the estimated effect for the
one-month yen contract was significant.
Several government announcements reflected a desire by the government to resolve
banking problems by transferring weak banks to stronger banks. These included the transfer of
the Honshu assets of Hokkaido Takushoku to the troubled Chuo Trust, and announcements of
DIC funds to encourage mergers of failed banks, as well as the series of announcements related
18to attempts to merge LTCB and Sumitomo Trust. These announcements caused the Japan
premium to increase for each of the four contracts, with the estimated effect significant for all
except the one-year dollar contract.
Thus, the events representing concrete actions influenced the size of the Japan premium
as predicted. Announcements related to equity infusions by the government into Japanese banks
tended to reduce the Japan premium, consistent with reducing the likelihood of an imminent
closure. On the other hand, announcements to strengthen supervision or to encourage healthy
banks to acquire their weaker brethren each resulted in higher premiums. The first type of
announcement increases the probability that a weak bank will be closed, while the latter increases
the probability that stronger banks will be weakened.
We include four categories of statements unaccompanied by concrete actions. These
include announcements that the Japanese government would resolve nonperforming loan
problems, that the banking problems were resolved, that disclosure should be expanded, and
announcements that aggregate nonperforming loans were higher or lower (event dummy entered
as a negative one). Among these words unaccompanied by actions, only those related to
statements that the problems were being resolved had a significant effect (and then only for the
one-year contracts). Thus, pronouncements not backed by concrete actions tended to have an
adverse effect or no effect on the Japan premium. Attempts to talk down the risk premiumwere,
for the most part, ineffective. The only significant pronouncements were announcements that
banking problems had been resolved. However, these announcements were associated with
increases rather than decreases in the base Japan premium paid by BOTM.
19Overall, the evidence presented in Table 2 indicates that concrete actions have
significantly affected the Japan premium. The closures of Hyogo Bank and Kizu Credit, the
closure of Yamaichi Securities, and actions taken by the government to inject funds into the
banking system, to strengthen supervision, and to return to the convoy system altered the
premium. Government statements not backed up by concrete actions appear to have had little
impact on the size of the Japan premium.
The Japan Premium for Fuji Bank
One of the clearest manifestations of the convoy system operating among major Japanese
banks was the ability of these banks to raise interbank Eurodollar and Euroyen funds at very
similar rates prior to November 1977, despite distinctions made among these banks by the major
rating agencies. For example, when Moody's first provided the Bank Financial Strength Ratings
(BFSR) on August 20, 1995, Bank of Tokyo, Mitsubishi Bank, and Sanwa Bank each had C+
ratings, while Sakura had a D+ rating. Yet throughout 1995 and 1996, the ILR quotes for
individual Japanese banks were very similar, with differences rarely more than a few basis
points. However, starting in November 1997, and especially following the failure of Yamaichi
Securities, the market began to distinguish among banks with respect to the riskiness of
unsecured interbank loans. These distinctions among banks likely were the result of a realization
that a far larger set of banks could fail if the market lost confidence in them, and that many of the
troubled banks might have large losses hidden from the market and regulators, as had Yamaichi.
To examine the factors that have had an impact on how the premium at a representative
weaker bank reacted, we have reestimated equation 1 for the premium paid by Fuji Bank, the
only other Japanese bank that is on the BBA panel for all four of the LIBOR contracts. By
20comparing the results for Fuji with those for BOTM, we can see whether the premium paid by
lower-rated banks systematically reacted more or less to specific events than did the "base" Japan
premium paid by BOTM. Table 3 presents the results using the same set of events as in Table 2.
The first clear evidence that the market was distinguishing between banks is that the Fuji
premium reacted much more to the Yamaichi failure than did the BOTM premium. Although the
estimated effect is the same as for BOTM for the one-month dollar contract, the response of the
Fuji premium is from 5 to 10 basis points larger (on average for each day of the two-day event
window) for the other three contracts.
Among the other announcements, little systematic difference is apparent. Actions to
inject funds into banks does appear to reduce the Fuji premium by more for the one-month yen
and one-year dollar contracts, and there is a slight tendency for actions that strengthen
supervision to raise the Fuji premium by more than was the case for BOTM. Among the Words
categories, statements that the problems have been resolved now have negative estimated effects
for the two yen contracts, with that for the one-year contract being significant, although it is less
than 1 basis point in size (on average).
4. Conclusion
The Japan premium has significantly increased the funding costs for Japanese banks since
its emergence in 1995. It has also played a major role in the shaping of government policy
toward the banking sector. By looking at major ratings changes, financial institution failures,
and government announcements, we can obtain a better understanding of the factors contributing
to the Japan premium. In effect, changes in the size of the premium provide a market indicator
21of whether actions taken by the government are viewed by investors as increasing or decreasing
the likelihood of repayment on unsecured interbank loans.
We find that while the Japan premium increased with the failures of Hyogo Bank and
Kizu Credit, that was not the case when Hokkaido Takushoku failed. In fact, the estimated
response was negative, although not statistically significant, for both of the yen-denominated
LIBOR contracts considered. Thus, not all bank closures are likely to undermine confidence in
Japanese banks. However, the reaction to the failure of Yamaichi Securities the following week
was quite different. Over the following three days, the Japan premium rose to unprecedented
levels, and the spread among the ILR quotes for major Japanese banks increased for the first
time. Yamaichi Securities failed, in part, as a result of large undisclosed losses. Furthermore,
the government was equivocating on how problem banks would be liquidated. Concerns with
possible undisclosed losses at other institutions and concerns that the government did not have an
effective plan to resolve banking problems caused investors to charge a much larger premium,
particularly for some of the weaker banks.
Government announcements that occur in the absence of concrete actions appear to be
ineffective. Announcements to resolve nonperforming loans had no discernible effect on the
Japan premium, while the reactions to announcements that banking problems were resolved were
actually perverse for BOTM. Similarly, announcements to enhance disclosure or of changes in
the levels of problem loans had no effect on the premium. On the other hand, announcements of
concrete actions did significantly alter the Japan premium. The injection of government funds
into the banking system decreased the premium, while actions to strengthen supervision
22increased the premium. There is also strong evidence that actions to return to theconvoy system
to resolve banking problems increased the Japan premium.
In summary, government actions have had more of an impact on the Japan premium than
statements of intent. The Japan premium had decreased substantially by March 1999. The
decreases have occurred after the Japanese government finally took concrete actions to address
the banking problems by infusing government funds into the bankingsystem and closing some of
the more troubled institutions. For the premium to remain low, investors must remain convinced
that concrete actions will be taken, if necessary, and that troubled banks that are notcompetitive
will be resolved in a way that does not imperil the remaining healthier banks.
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25</ref_section>Footnotes
1.Forexample, at their peak, Japanese banks accounted for 18 percent of commercial and
industrial loans in the United States and 20 percent of commercial real estate loans by banks in
the United States.
2.TheHyogo Bank failure was announced at the same time as the closure of Kizu Credit
Cooperative. While Kizu was the largest credit cooperative, it had only 9 billion yen in total
assets, compared to 3.7 trillion yen for Hyogo Bank.
3.Eachbank is asked to report the rate at which it would borrow funds, were it to do so, by
asking for and then accepting interbank offers in reasonable market size just prior to 11:00 a.m.
London time. The official LIBOR rate is calculated by eliminating the top and bottom quartiles
of the contributor panel quotes, and then calculating the arithmetic average of the two middle
quartiles. This average rate is the LIBOR fixing for that particular currency, maturity, and fixing
date.
4.Thetime difference between Tokyo and London is eight-hours when daylight savings time is
in effect and nine hours when it is not.
5. Differentsets of banks are used for the dollar and for the yen LIBOR instruments. For
the dollar contracts, only three Japanese banks are used by the BBA: BOTM, Fuji Bank, and
Sumitomo Trust. For the yen contracts, the eight Japanese banks that report are BOTM, Fuji,
26Sanwa, Industrial Bank of Japan, Sakura, Tokai, Dai-Ichi Kangyo, and Sumitomo Bank.
Because of concern that the Japan premium was disrupting the calculation of LIBOR and that
some banks' offers might not reflect transactions, the BBA dropped Sumitomo Trust from the
dollar panel and Tokai and Sakura from the yen panel in January 1999. Norinchukin Bank has
been added to both the yen and dollar panels.
6.Thisspecification is similar in spirit to earlier studies that look at how particular events
affected municipal bond market spreads (for example, Kidwell and Trzcinka 1982, 1983).
7.Thus,data do not include weekends, or days that are either (or both) Japanese holidays for
which the Japanese ILR quotes are unavailable or U.S. and U.K. holidays for which reference
bank ILR data are unavailable. Furthermore, isolated days for which no quote is available for a
Japanese bank are treated as missing observations. The changes in ILR rates are calculated
between adjacent trading days, that is, days for which all necessary data are available.
8.Thedollar panel included Citibank, Chase, Lloyds, Barclays, National Westminster, Royal
Bank of Scotland, Abbey National, BOTM, Fuji, Sumitomo Trust, Westpac, Commerzbank,
Deutshe Bank, Merita, Swiss Bank, and Hambros. On January 29, 1999 several banks were
dropped, including Sumitomo Trust. The yen panel included Citibank, JP Morgan, Lloyds,
National Westminster, Midland, Barclays, BOTM, Fuji, Sumitomo, DKB, Tokai, Sakura, IBJ,
Sanwa, Bank of China and Swiss Bank. On January 29, 1999 several banks were dropped
including Tokai and Sakura.
279. Some of the aggregate movement in stock prices may be hedged with derivatives contracts on
stocks. Given the volatility, this would be expensive. Furthermore, the portfolio concentrations
of Japanese banks may not be reflective of the broader index, making the hedge imperfect.
10. For S&P and Moody's ratings changes, we verified from Bloomberg the exact time of the
announcement so that we could properly date the event. Many of the IBCA ratings changes do
not appear on Bloomberg, so we have relied on correspondence with IBCA to date their
announcements.
ii. Some ratings, such as Moody's Bank Financial Strength Rating (BFSR) rating, try to focus
on the probability that the bank fails, rather than mixing the probability of failure with the
likelihood of government support.
12. We also include the date of the first BFSR's issued by Moody's, many of which were lower
than had been expected. In addition, we include downgrades that might affect Japanese firms
generally, such as Japan's long-term foreign currency rating.
13. We also examined Sanyo Securities, which was below our size threshold but had been
highlighted by Brewer et a!. (1999) as a significant financial event. We did not find that the
Sanyo failure announcement had any statistically significant impact on the Japan premium.
2814. Ifa ratings downgrade coincides with another major event, we constrain its effect to be equal
to the average for ratings downgrades and allow any remaining effect on that date to be attributed
to the other coincident event. Only three other event dates coincide with ratings downgrades.
They are the announcement on 12/22/95 of the FSRC final report, the announcement on
12/29/97 of the easing of accounting rules, and the announcement on 8/27/98 that Sumitomo
Trust was delaying its decision on the merger with LTCB.
15.Twoof the announcement dates coincide with other event dates, the 7/4/97 announcement of
lower bad loans and the 8/21/98 announcement related to the merger of LTCB and Sumitomo
Trust. For these two events, we constrain their effects to be equal to the average effect of









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chronology of Events (dated as of 11:00 a.m. London time)
Event Date Event Category Description
5/15/95 Words: expand disclosure Financial System Research Council (FSRC) report on
expanding disclosure
6/8/95 Words: resolving NPLs MOF indicates stance in dealing with NPLs
6/20/95 Ratings IBCA downgrades Sakura, Daiwa
8/21/95 Ratings Moody's assigns BFSR
8/30/95 Financial: Hyogo/Kizu Hyogo Bank and Kizu Credit fails
9/26/95 Miscellaneous BOJ: Daiwa Bank statement
9/27/95 Words: resolving NPLs MOF & FSRC statement on NPLs
10/20/95 Ratings IBCA downgrades 10 banks; Moody's downgrades 3
11/13/95 Words: NPL announcements MOF reduces estimate of NPL to 37.4 trillion yen
11/22/95 Miscellaneous MOF transfers Kizu credit assets and liabilities to Tokyo
Kyodou Bank
-
12/19/95 Actions: Jusen Cabinet: measures to address Jusen problem
12/22/95 Words: resolving NPLs FSRC final report
Ratings S&P downgrades Mitsubishi, Sanwa, Sumitomo, DKB
12/27/95*Actions: strengthen supervision MOF: measures to improve bank supervision
1/23/96 Ratings Moody's downgrades Sakura, LTCB, Daiwa
1/30/96 Actions: Jusen Cabinet approves measures to address Jusen problem
2/9/96 Actions: Jusen Cabinet bill establishing Jusen Resolution Corp.
4/1/96* Financial Taiheiyo Bank fails
6/18/96 Actions: Jusen Diet passes 6 bills including Jusen liquidation
6/27/96 Ratings IBCA downgrades Sumitomo, DKB, Sanwa
7/3/96 Actions: strengthen supervision MOF: enhanced disclosure
7/22/96 Actions: Jusen DIC: establish Financial Stabilization Contribution Fund
9/18/96 Words: expand disclosure MOF: report advocating increased transparency
12/24/96 Actions: strengthen supervision Establish Financial Inspection and Monitoring Agency
12/27/96*Actions: Jusen DIC: V680 billion to Housing Loan Admin. Corp. for Jusen
2/10/97 Words: problems resolved Finance Minister-support largest banks in crisis
3/11/97 Actions: strengthen supervision Cabinet adopts bill to establish FSA
4/1/97 Financial NCB affiliates including Crown Leasing file for bankruptcy
6/30/97 Actions: relax regulations MOF: relaxation of bank regulations regarding capital
7/4/97 Nonfinancial Takai Kosyo, a construction contractor, to file for bankruptcy
Words: NPL announcements MOF reduces estimate of problem loans to V27.9 trillion
7/31/97 Actions: strengthen supervision MOF: Prompt Corrective Action ordinances
10/27/97 Ratings IBCA downgrades Sanwa, Sumitomo, DKB, BOTM
11/13/97 Ratings IBCA downgrades Fuji, IBJ, Sakura
11/14/97 Ratings IBCA downgrades Tokai, Asahi, Mitsui Trust, Mitsubishi
Trust, Sumitomo Trust, Yasuda Trust
11/17/97 Financial: Hokkaido Takushoku Hokkaido Takushoku closed
11/25/97*Financial: Yamaichi Securities Yamaichi Securities closed
11/28/97 Words: problems resolved MOF: close banks that are insolvent
12/1/97 Words: problems resolved Prime Minister: close banks that are insolventTable 1
Chronology of Events (dated as of 11:00 a.m. London time)
Event Date Event Category Description
12/2/97 Ratings: IBCA IBCA downgrades LTCB, DKB, Sumitomo, Sanwa,
Hokkaido Takushoku
12/3/97 Actions: strengthen supervision Diet passes bill for stricter penalties for improper acts by
financial institutions
12/8/97 Actions: inject funds LDP Official: plan to use government funds for problem
banks
12/12/97 Actions: convoy DIC extend assistance for mergers of failed banks
12/19/97 Nonfinancial Toshoku Ltd., a food trading company, files for bankruptcy
12/29/97*Ratings S&P downgrades Sakura and Sanwa
Actions: relax regulations MOF: postpone implementation of new capital standards and
relaxation of other accounting rules
1/8/98 Actions: inject funds MOF: provides details of government injections
1/12/98 Words: NPL announcements MOF: classified loans jumped to V76.7 trillion
1/27/98 Miscellaneous Finance Minister resigns due to banking scandals
1/28/98 Ratings S&P downgrades DKB; IBCA downgrades Sakura
2/17/98 Actions: convoy BOJ: transfer of Hokkaido Takushoku's businesses
2/18/98 Actions: inject funds 17 trillion government funds to DIC
2/26/98 Actions: strengthen supervision DIC published examination criteria for funds injection
3/5/98 Actions: inject funds Banks will apply for government funds
3/17/98 Actions: inject funds Cabinet approves injection of funds
3/30/98* Ratings S&P downgrades BOTM, Asahi, LTCB, Daiwa
3/31/98 Actions: strengthen supervision BOJ & MOF announce supervision policy
4/1/98 Nonfinancial Daiichi Corp, a real estate company, will liquidate
4/3/98 Ratings: country ceiling negative Moody's changes currency ceiling outlook to negative
5/21/98 Ratings IBCA downgrades 7 banks
5/27/98 Ratings Moody's downgrades 6 banks'
6/1/98 Miscellaneous Tax law changed to aid bad loan removal
6/16/98 Words: expand disclosure BOJ: remarks advocate enhanced disclosure
6/18/98 Words: resolving NPLs Finance Minister advocates forcing banks to address bad loan
problem
6/22/98 Actions: strengthen supervision Financial Supervisory Agency established
6/23/98 Miscellaneous First report on the Total Plan
6/26/98 Actions: convoy Sumitomo Trust announces plans to merge with LTCB
7/2/98 Actions: inject funds Second report on the Total Plan, includes V30 trillion of
public funds
7/17/98 Words: NPL announcements FSA: NPLs rose using new standards
7/23/98 Ratings Moody's places country rating on review
7/30/98 Ratings S&P downgrades Sumitomo Trust and Mitsubishi Trust
8/17/98* Ratings IBCA downgrades 6 banks
8/21/98 Nonfinancial Okura & Co., steel and machinery trading company, files for
bankruptcy
Actions: convoy Finance Minister promotes LTCB restructure for merger
8/24/98* Ratings IBCA downgrades 6 banksTable I
Chronology of Events (dated as of 11:00 a.m. London time)
Event Date Event Category Description
8/27/98 Ratings Moody's downgrades Asahi and Tokai
Actions: convoy Sumitomo Trust delays merger decision
9/2/98 Ratings IBCA long-term currency rating on review
9/17/98 Actions: convoy LDP accepts opposition proposal to nationalize LTCB
9/21/98 Ratings IBCA downgrades long-term foreign currency rating
9/28/98 Financial Japan Leasing, a LTCB affiliate, files for bankruptcy
10/7/98 Actions: inject funds LDP gains support for bank bill
10/9/98 Actions: inject funds Increase public money in bank bill
10/12/98 Actions: inject funds Upper House approves bank bill
10/23/98 Financial LTCB nationalized
11/17/98 Ratings Moody's downgrades Japan's debt
12/11/98 Financial: NCB Nippon Credit Bank may be nationalized
12/14/98*Financial: NCB Nippon Credit Bank nationalized
12/24/98*Ratings S&P downgrades 7 banks
1/20/99 Words: resolving NPLs Yanagisawa: write-off all bad loans by March 31
1/22/99 Ratings Moody's downgrades IBJ and DKB
1/25/99 Actions: strengthen supervision Strict new requirements for loan loss provisions
1/26/99 Ratings Moody's downgrades 5banks
2/2/99 Words: problems resolved Sakakibara: "financial crisis will be over in two weeks"
2/8/99 Words: problems resolved Yamagisawa: committed to wiping up the problems and will
give banks the money to do it
2/10/99 Ratings IBC downgrades 7 banks
3/5/99 Actions: inject funds 15 banks apply for public funds
3/19/99 Ratings Moody's downgrades Tokai and Asahi
*Event date differs from actual date because markets were closed on announcement date.Table 2
Determinants of the Japan Premium for Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi
February 1, 1995 through March 31, 1999
I Month YenI Month Dollar1 Year Yen 1 Year Dollar
Ratings
!BCA Downgrade .205** .051 .150** .174**
(5.49) (1.20) (4.99) (5.34)
Country Ceiling Negative .127** .042 .049 .116**
(3.40) (0.98) (1.79) (3.97)
Other Ratings (27 events) .010 .009 .011 .006
(1.25) (1.05) (1.87) (1.07)
Financial
Hyogo BanklKizu Credit .096** .066* .040* .049**
(3.62) (2.17) (2.38) (2.73)
HokkaidoTakushoku -.033 -.047 .012 .014
(1.22) (1.52) (0.72) (0.79)
Yamaichi Securities .075** .127** .065** .1 17**
(2.85) (4.21) (3.84) (6.48)
Other Financial Failures -.0 10 -.005 .000 -.004
(6 events) (0.92) (0.38) (0.02) (0.46)
Nonfinancial
Nonfinancial Failures .035 -.00 1 .009 .006
(4 events) (1.30) (0.04) (0.44) (0.28)
Actions
InjectFunds .024* -.033 .022** .032**
(10 events) (1.86/2.171) (2.37/1.428) (2.45/2.420) (3.41/5.883)
Strengthen Supervision .051 ** •Ø34** .009 .002
(10 events) (3.97/15.401)(2.50/3.812) (0.98/1.299) (0.16/0.415)
Relax Regulations .15l** -.027 .004 -.002
(2 events) (5.20/26.179)(0.86/0.302) (0.19/1.240) (0.08/0.009)
Convoy System .059** .078** .042** .009
(6 events) (3.47/5.685) (4.26/7.247) (3.59/6.683) (0.73/1 .095)
Words
Resolving NPLs .000 .012 .001 -.007
(5 events) (0.02/0.034) (0.63/1.089) (0.11/0.335) (0.50/0.579)
Problems Resolved .017 .021 .021** .032*
(5 events) (0.91/2.150) (1.08/0.594) (1.70/5.430) (2.46/2.655)
Expand Disclosure -.000 .002 -.008 .002
(3 events) (0.01/0.005) (0.09/0.004) (0.49/0.175) (0.11/0.059)
NPL Announcements .003 -.004 -.001 .013
(4 events) (0.15/0.124) (0.16/0.242) (0.06/0.311) (0.86/0.427)
Serial Correlation .323** 353**
Coefficient (10.36) (11.47)
Observations 990 993 994 990
R2 .277 .132 .184 .202
SER .037 .043 .029 .031
SSR 1.285 1.682 .755 0.878
D.W. 2.18 2.13Each equation also includes as control variables the percent change in the Nikkei index, the
percent change in the yen-dollar exchange rate, the set of Jusen announcements,and the five
miscellaneous announcements. Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses for each
coefficient. In addition, for each set of Actions and Words events, the F-statistic for the set of
events is reported following the t-statistic, with the asterisks in these cases referring to
significance of the F-statistic rather than the t-statistic.
*Significantat the 5percentlevel.
**Significantat the 1 percent level.Table 3
Determinants of the Japan Premium for Fuji Bank
February 1, 1995 through March 31, 1999




Country Ceiling Negative .127** .102
(3.07) (1.83) (2.09) (3.71)
Other Ratings (27 events) .006 .005 .003 .016
(0.67) (0.45) (0.51) (1.50)
Financial




Yamaichi Securities ,122** .125**
(4.17) (3.14) (9.95) (6.57)
Other Financial Failures -.0 16 -.026 -.003 -.001





(10 events) (2.15/2.574)(1.65/1.000) (2.44/3.706) (3.08/3.837)
Strengthen Supervision •Q54** .044** .016** -.003
(10 events) (3.79/16.101)(2.40/5.623) (1.84/2.436) (0.20/0.610)
Relax Regulations .120** -.012 -.006 -.010
(2events) (3.72/12.418)(0.30/0.037)
ConvoySystem .068** .058**










.050 -.005 .035 .039
(1.69) (0.14) (1.86) (1.04)
Actions









(5 events) (0.38/0.272)(0.48/1.478) (0.03/0.695) (1.15/0.510)
Problems Resolved -.002 .005 ,ØØ9* .003
(5 events) (0.12/1.035)(0.18/0.146) (0.73/2.654) (0.16/0.415)
ExpandDisclosure -.011 .023 .021 .004
(3 events) (0.41/0.243)(0.70/0.468) (1.30/1.528) (0.13/0.064)
NPLAnnouncements .013 .005 .005 -.007





Observations 985 980 992 980
R2 .275 .127 .260 .147
SER .041 .056 .027 .055
SSR 1.560 2.870 .663 2.760
D.W. 2.12 2.29Each equation also includes as control variables the percent change in the Nikkei index, the
percent change in the yen-dollar exchange rate, the set of Jusen announcements, and the five
miscellaneous announcements. Absolute values oft-statistics are in parentheses for each
coefficient. In addition, for each set of Actions and Words events, the F-statistic for the set of
events is reported following the t-statistic, with the asterisks in these cases referring to
significance of the F-statistic rather than the t-statistic.
*Significantat the 5percentlevel.
**Significantat the 1 percent level.